activity, however, is found in legislative statutes calling for exclusion. This Minnesota statute, for example, is unusual. "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court for the district in which the property was seized ... for the return of the property and to suppress the use, as evidence, of anything so obtained."'0 Most of the state activity, instead, has been centered in analyses of various state constitutional provisions. In a host of different areas, parallel state constitutional provisions have been interpreted by state courts to provide greater protection for criminal defendants than the federal counterparts. In short, in several areas the defendant is more likely to have evidence excluded under state constitutional law than under federal constitutional law. "The federal constitution establishes minimum rather than maximum guarantees of individual rights, and the state courts independently determine, according to their own law (generally their own state constitutions), the nature of the protection of the individual against state government."" To demonstrate both the impact of this application of state constitutional law, and the important changes in the area, we shall look to recent cases from three different states.
In State v. Novembrino12 the New Jersey Supreme Court decided to reject the United States Supreme Court's exception to the exclusionary rule for searches in good faith conducted pursuant to warrants.'3 Instead, the court remarked that state constitutional provisions may be a source "of individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.'4 Though the language of the New Jersey constitution was "virtually identical" to that of the federal fourth amendment, the court expressly rejected the United States Supreme Court view on this so-called good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
[S]uch a rule would tend to undermine the constitutionallyguaranteed standard of probable cause, and in the process disrupt the highly effective procedures employed by our [Vol. 38
criminal justice system to accommodate that constitutional guarantee without impairing law enforcement.'5 California also has applied its state constitution to exclude evidence which would not necessarily be excluded in federal criminal cases. The court in People v. Houston'6 rejected a decision of the United States Supreme Court under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in which the Court had held that it was no violation of constitutional rights for government officers to conceal from the defendant the fact that his attorney was attempting to reach him at the police station so long as the attorney was not physically present there.'7 The California Supreme Court found that the "state charters offer important local protection against the ebbs and flows of federal constitutional interpretation.'8 The court made clear that exclusion was required under the state constitution even though the United States Constitution reached a different result.'9
Finally, the most striking use of a state rule of exclusion may be the Massachusetts doctrine established in Commonwealth v. Blood.20 There the issue concerned the common "one party consent" case in which an informer is "wired" for sound and then engages in a tape recorded conversation with the defendant. The conversation is ultimately used against the defendant because it contains her incriminating remarks. The United States Supreme Court has found that such activity is not affected by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because one of the two parties to the conversation consented to its being recorded.2' The Massachusetts court looked to its own state Declaration of Rights and found that while the language there was similar to that of the United States Constitution the rule of exclusion would be quite different. against the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Then the Court, through Chief Justice Earl Warren, found that the privilege would not be satisfied in the usual police setting33 unless the defendant was specifically warned of the right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present, and the fact that anything said by the defendant would be used against him at trial.34 What made the opinion more striking, and more powerful, was that the Court found that if the warnings were not given exclusion was the proper remedy because the prosecution could not use the defendant's statements against him at trial to prove his guilt. 35 The Miranda decision continues to be debated even today.36 Moreover, some severe limitations have been imposed on the holding of Miranda including the government's ability to use the confession for purposes of impeachment when the defendant testifies at trial,37 and the inapplicability of Miranda to situations in which the interrogation by the officers is not for reasons of receiving incriminating information but rather to protect the public. For the past 30 years in the United States the rules of exclusion in criminal cases have been sharply debated and harshly criticized. The primary criticism is one which has existed for decades. Essentially it is the notion that the exclusionary rule is the wrong mechanism for dealing with unconstitutional law enforcement techniques. Two famous American jurists had widely different views of the matter. Justice (then judge) Cardozo noted that the defect with the exclusionary rule is that "the criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."'61 California Chief Justice Roger Traynor, however, took a very different view of the matter, contending that this criticism is not properly directed at the exclusionary rule, but at the constitutional provisions themselves. It was rejected when those provisions were adopted. In such cases had the Constitution been obeyed, the criminal could in no event be convicted. He does not go free because the constable blundered, but because the Constitutions prohibit securing the evidence against him. Their very provisions contemplate that it is preferable that some criminals go free than that the right of privacy of all the people be set at naught.62 Moreover, the evidence with respect to the number of criminals going free as a result of the exclusionary rule is unclear, at best.
Contrary to the claims of the rule's critics that exclusion leads to "the release of countless guilty criminals," these studies have demonstrated that federal and state prosecutors very rarely drop cases because of potential search and 60. Id. at 921. The Court did note, however, that reliance on a warrant would not always be viewed as satisfying the rules regarding exclusion of evidence.
"We do not suggest, however, that exclusion is always inappropriate in cases where an officer has obtained a warrant and abided by its terms. Searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness, for a warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish that a law enforcement officer has acted in good faith in conducting the search. Nevertheless, the officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable, and it is clear that in some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. The exclusionary rule in the United States is seemingly explainable only as a result of great concern regarding government overreaching vis-a-vis individual rights of privacy and liberty. As Professor Stepan has well noted, in the first known manual for interrogators in the 14th century, the Spanish inquisitor Eymericus stated: "Non refert quomodo veritas habeatur, dummodo habeatur."
[Vol. 38 Translated, "it does not matter by which methods truth has been obtained so long as it has been obtained."74 As a result of historical and societal views in the United States, however, that point of view has been rejected with a vengeance. While there has been widespread criticism of the exclusionary rule, substantial support for it still exists in the United States and it is used throughout the country. Perhaps the best explanation for this apparently drastic remedy was offered by Justice Clark in the case establishing the exclusionary rule for unlawful searches and seizures, Mapp v. Ohio. In response to criticism regarding the harshness of the exclusionary doctrine, Clark noted that "there is another consideration -the imperative of judicial integrity. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."75
The argument was stated forcefully by Justice Frankfurter decades ago:
It is vital, no doubt, that criminals should be detected, and that all relevant evidence should be secured and used. On the other hand, it cannot be said too often that what is involved far transcends the fate of some sordid offender. Nothing less is involved than that which makes for an atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and repression for society as a whole. 76 
